



MARKSCHEME

May 2013

HISTORY

Route 2

Higher Level

**Paper 3 – Aspects of the history
of Africa**

34 pages

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*Paper 3 markbands: The following bands provide a précis of the full markbands for paper 3 published in the History guide (2008) on pages 77–81. They are intended to assist marking, but must be used in conjunction with the full markbands found in the guide. **For the attention of all examiners: if you are uncertain about the content/accuracy of a candidate’s work please contact your team leader.***

0:	Answers not meeting the requirements of descriptors should be awarded no marks.
1–2:	Answers do not meet the demands of the question and show little or no evidence of appropriate structure. There is little more than unsupported generalization.
3–4:	There is little understanding of the question. Historical knowledge is present but the detail is insufficient. Historical context or processes are barely understood and there are little more than poorly substantiated assertions.
5–6:	Answers indicate some understanding of the question, but historical knowledge is limited in quality and quantity. Understanding of historical processes may be present but underdeveloped. The question is only partially addressed.
7–8:	The demands of the question are generally understood. Relevant, historical knowledge is present but is unevenly applied. Knowledge is narrative or descriptive in nature. There may be limited argument that requires further substantiation. Critical commentary may be present. An attempt to place events in historical context and show an understanding of historical processes. An attempt at a structured approach, either chronological or thematic has been made.
9–11:	Answers indicate that the question is understood, but not all implications considered. Knowledge is largely accurate. Critical commentary may be present. Events are generally placed in context, and historical processes, such as comparison and contrast, are understood. There is a clear attempt at a structured approach. Focus on AO1, AO2 and AO4. Responses that simply summarize the views of historians cannot reach the top of this markband.
12–14:	Answers are clearly focused on the demands of the question. Relevant in-depth knowledge is applied as evidence, and analysis or critical commentary is used to indicate some in-depth understanding, but is not consistent throughout. Events are placed in context and there is sound understanding of historical processes and comparison and contrast. Evaluation of different approaches may be used to substantiate arguments presented. Synthesis is present, but not always consistently integrated. Focus on AO3 and AO4.
15–17:	Answers are clearly structured and focused, have full awareness of the demands of the question, and if appropriate may challenge it. Accurate and detailed historical knowledge is used convincingly to support critical commentary. Historical processes such as comparison and contrast, placing events in context and evaluating different interpretations are used appropriately and effectively. Answers are well-structured and balanced and synthesis is well-developed and supported with knowledge and critical commentary.
18–20:	Answers are clearly focused with a high degree of the awareness of the question and may challenge it successfully. Knowledge is extensive, accurately applied and there may be a high level of conceptual ability. Evaluation of different approaches may be present as may be understanding of historical processes as well as comparison and contrast where relevant. Evaluation is integrated into the answer. The answer is well-structured and well-focused. Synthesis is highly developed.

Pre-colonial African states (Eastern and Central Africa) 1840–1900

1. Assess the contribution of Johannes/Yohannis IV to the reunification of Ethiopia.

The focus of this question is the reunification of Ethiopia, so discussion of modernization would not be relevant. The external threats to Ethiopia during Yohannis's reign event could be made relevant, however, as a successful foreign invasion would probably have resulted in political fragmentation and/or the end of Ethiopian independence.

Yohannis IV benefited from the defeat of Tewodros II by the British in 1868. He acquired firearms in return for logistical support, and used these weapons to defeat the newly-proclaimed Emperor Tekle Giyorgis II in 1871. However, he learned from Tewodros's failure and strengthened his authority by diplomacy rather than war. He had more cautious objectives and created a federation rather than a unitary state. He regarded himself as a first among equals and was ready to share authority with his subordinates, provided his position as Emperor was recognized. He tolerated regionalism because he was aware of the many impediments standing in the way of establishing a strongly centralized state. He sought accommodation with his two main rivals, Adal, later called Tekle-Haymanot of Gojjam, and Menelik of Shoa. In 1878 Menelik submitted to Yohannis, in an episode illustrated how intermarriage was used as a means of conciliating Yohannis's rivals and strengthening his rule. Menelik's daughter married Yohannis's son, and Menelik agreed to pay him an annual tribute and provide supplies to the imperial army. He dropped his claim to the imperial title and was in return recognized as Negus of Shoa. But Yohannis's policy of creating a loosely federated Ethiopia encouraged centrifugal tendencies which were always a potential threat to the unity of the state. He never really established his authority over Gojjam and Shoa, and Menelik refused to fight with him against the Sudanese Mahdists in 1889. On the whole, because he was realistic and generally avoided making enemies, he enjoyed some success in re-uniting Ethiopia.

He was also successful in dealing with external threats to the country. The first major threat came from Ottoman Egypt. The Egyptians were decisively defeated at Gundat in 1875. Yohannis could not afford indirect control in areas threatened by foreign invasion, and he made his trusted general Ras Alula governor of the northern regions which bordered Egypt. However, the result of the victory at Gundat was that, in the words of historian Sven Rubenson, Yohannis "traded one weak enemy for two stronger ones": the Sudanese Mahdist state and Italy. The Italians acquired the port of Assab. In 1887 Ras Alula defeated them at the battle of Dogali. Yohannis sought to end the Italian occupation of Massawa, but first had to deal with the Mahdists, who had sacked Gondar. At the close of what had been a victorious battle at Metemma in 1889, he was killed by a stray bullet.

Good answers should combine an in-depth discussion of his contribution with well supported analysis of the extent of his success. It would be acceptable to put his achievements in a wider context by making some reference to his predecessor Tewodros and, in particular, his successor Menelik II. The threat of foreign invasion was finally ended by Menelik with victory over the Italians at Adowa in 1896, and the process of building a centralized state was only cemented when he established Addis Ababa as a permanent capital.

2. Compare and contrast the roles of Mirambo in the rise of Unyamwezi and Mzilikazi in the rise of the Ndebele.

Good answers will have a clear comparative structure and not just be sequential accounts which do not explicitly pinpoint similarities and differences. In each case the leadership role of Mirambo and Mzilikazi was crucial, but the circumstances which facilitated the rise of each state were different.

Mirambo was the son of a minor Nyamwezi chief in the north west of present-day Tanzania. He gained experience as a warrior and trader and gained a large and loyal following, which helped him create a larger state of his own. A successful warlord and state-builder, he prospered as a result of his strategic position along the long-distance trade routes from Zanzibar to the interior. Mirambo built on the existing trade of the Nyamwezi in salt, ironwork, copper and livestock, and entered the slave trade and the international trade in ivory as well. He controlled the major trade routes from Tabora to Ujiji, Buganda and Shaba, and could exact tolls on all of them. He fought against the Swahili Arabs of Tabora until they agreed to pay tolls. He adopted new military techniques from the Tuta Ngoni, a marauding group of refugees who had fled from the Mfecane, and who had reached Unyamwezi in the 1850s. Mirambo learnt the Ngoni language and built a mercenary army of men from many different ethnic groups, called the ruga ruga. His reputation as a military strategist was such that Stanley referred to him as the “Central African Bonaparte”. Despite his successful expansion of Unyamwezi and his many personal qualities, Mirambo was not a successful modernizer. The state he created did not long survive his death in 1884. He created no centralized administration, and after his death many local rulers reasserted their authority. The personal loyalty of his soldiers was not carried over to his successors.

This was not the case with Mzilikazi, whose successor Lobengula continued to consolidate the Ndebele state. While Mirambo made successful use of the Tuta Ngoni who had fled from the south, the Ndebele were themselves refugees from the Mfecane. Mzilikazi had succeeded his father in 1818 as ruler of the Khumalo chiefdom, a group allied to the Ndwandwe under Zwide. Mzilikazi transferred his allegiance from Zwide to the Zulus under Shaka, and the presence of his troops was a factor in the Zulu victory over the Ndwandwe. These events precipitated the Mfecane. He eventually quarrelled with Shaka and fled north with his people. He established a powerful state by taking advantage of the depopulation of much of the interior caused by the Mfecane, and by incorporating many Sotho-speaking communities. Threatened by powerful enemies, the most notable of which were the Boers in the Transvaal, he moved his capital several times and eventually settled in western Zimbabwe. His state survived and expanded through geographical mobility (unlike Mirambo and the Unyamwezi) and through military might (like Mirambo). His success resulted from his effective political and military organization, which he adopted from the Zulu state. He used diplomacy whenever possible to achieve peace with his enemies, and tried to foster a sense of common identity between conquered peoples and his ruling elite. He had opened up his state to European missionaries and traders before his death in 1868. In about 1840, Mzilikazi had conquered the Rozwi Empire and set up a new Ndebele kingdom with its capital near Bulawayo. Weak and divided Shona states were attacked by the Ndebele and many became vassals of Mzilikazi. He developed a strong and effective central government, unlike Mirambo. In its early years it was a military state but it gradually became more civil as regimental bodies were reorganized into regional administrative units. *Indunas* took on civil as well as military duties as territorial chiefs. Mzilikazi used marriage to several hundred wives from different sections of the nation as a means of unifying Ndebele society under his rule.

Good answers should have a balanced and in-depth assessment of both leaders.

If only one ruler is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].

Pre-colonial African states (Southern and West Africa) 1800–1900

3. In what ways did the acquisition of modern trading skills enable the rise of new leaders like Jaja and Nana in the Niger Delta?

The question does not stipulate that Jaja and Nana should be mentioned specifically in the essay, and it is possible that a candidate might produce a strong general response to the title. However, most good essays will make use of the examples of Jaja and Nana in order to illustrate explanations of how developments in trade facilitated the rise of new leaders in the Delta.

The nineteenth century saw the decline in the Niger Delta of the Atlantic slave trade and the rise of the palm oil trade. The delta city states extended their trading empires into the interior and encroached on the markets of the palm-oil producers. City states such as Brass, Nembe, Calabar and Bonny were divided into houses. Each house had its own trading and war canoes. House heads were second in rank to the king. Traditionally they had been members of the royal family, but in the nineteenth century more commoners and even ex-slaves were promoted on the basis of their ability to trade and compete with commercial rivals. The social mobility that was possible in the houses led to the rise of new men who challenged the authority of traditional rulers in the delta.

The competition between states was so fierce that each house tried to choose the most talented individuals. This meant that traders could be ex-slaves like Alali, head of the Anna Pepple house in Bonny. Another ex-slave was Jaja, from the Orlu area of Igboland in the Niger delta. He too became head of the Anna Pepple house. However, Anna Pepple soon lost out in a struggle with its bitter rival, the Manilla Pepples. Jaja led his followers to a new home on an island at the mouth of the Imo river. Here, at Opobo, he was able to cut Bonny off from the palm oil markets. Bonny fell into serious financial problems while Opobo flourished. Jaja acted as a middle man between the oil producers upriver and the British. He decided to deal exclusively with the Alexander Miller Company at the expense of its rivals. This threw the British companies into fierce competition, and Jaja was able to take advantage. When the British attempted to set fixed prices he successfully broke into the export trade and shipped palm oil directly to England. He gained political capital by using his wealth to send soldiers to fight with the British in the Ashanti War of 1875. Relations deteriorated only after the British declared a Gulf of Guinea Protectorate, attempted to impose free trade in the region, and resolved to “cut out the middle man” altogether – in other words, Jaja.

The Itsekiri were a trading people in the Western Niger Delta. The delta was a maze of waterways and mangrove swamps, and farming was impossible. The Itsekiri relied on exporting salt and dried fish in return for yams, livestock and other foods. As long-distance traders, they were also much involved in the slave trade, and found the transition to the palm oil trade very difficult. This led to a political upheaval in 1848 when slaves took control of the capital, and the Olu or traditional ruler was replaced by a wealthy trader, Olomu. His success aroused the jealousy of the ousted royal family, of other trading houses, and even of his own family, and he fought two wars against the neighbouring Urhobo. The British government appointed consuls in southwestern Nigeria and these too caused occasional problems to Olomu, sometimes bombarding his land or imposing heavy fines. Olomu needed a more defensible headquarters and built the well-fortified town of Ebrohimi, reclaimed from the mangrove swamp. His son Nana replaced him on his death in 1883. Nana faced challenges from three different sources: his trading rivals, those who felt that he should not have succeeded his father, and the British who could not tolerate an independent state so close to their delta protectorate. The British were the biggest threat. They found Nana, who was declared “Governor of the Rivers” in 1885, to be a formidable opponent. He continued to maintain control over the Itsekiri and shared custom duties with them. He stationed agents across the region, and responded to a British decision to establish a vice-consulate in Sapele by sending his own agent. When the price of oil fell, Nana’s successful solution to the problem was to withhold supply.

The question is about how trading skills led to the emergence of new leaders, and not about the later confrontation with the British. This need not be referred to, or at most should get a passing mention.

If only one leader is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

4. Analyse the social, political and economic factors which contributed to the emergence and growth of *either* the Zulu kingdom under Shaka Zulu *or* the Sotho kingdom under Mosheshwe.

Many candidates will focus on the personal agency of Shaka or Mosheshwe in the emergence and growth of the Zulu and Sotho respectively, and a consideration of their role of each is obviously unavoidable. However, the question specifies social, political and economic factors, and these should be made explicit in strong candidate responses.

Candidates discussing the rise of the Zulu will no doubt have a lot to say about the phenomenon of the Mfecane. Since the Zulus had a part to play in its outbreak and were ultimately its main beneficiaries, a brief consideration of the general causes of the Mfecane would therefore be appropriate. These could include the following: an increase in population across the region which resulted from the introduction of corn, and a corresponding rise in the number of young men of fighting age; a drought in the region which put pressure on the emerging kingdoms and intensified competition for resources; the new economic opportunities which resulted from the presence of Portuguese traders at Delagoa Bay and the rivalries which ensued over access to the trading routes; and the destabilizing impact of slaving raids from Delagoa Bay and the Cape. Reference may also be made to the circumstances which precipitated the Mfecane. Dingiswayo of the Mthethwa was defeated and killed by his principal rival in the region, Zwide of the Ndwandwe. The remnants of the Mthethwa armies then joined forces with the rising Zulu kingdom under Shaka, who was thus able to defeat Zwide. This set in motion a complex series of chain reactions, where routed armies would flee and then settle, only to attack local peoples who would in turn be displaced. Amidst all of this carnage, the Zulu were to emerge as the dominant force.

One of the keys to the success of the Zulu is that Shaka developed a centralized form of government. He imposed Zulu customs and his own personal will on all the territory from the Drakensberg to the sea. He subdued neighbouring tribes and exercised absolute authority. In newly-conquered regions, hereditary chiefs were replaced by royal officials or *indunas*, who were directly responsible to the king. Any group that did not submit was destroyed. At the time whole villages, men, women and children, were literally wiped out. Sometimes the *indunas* were the former hereditary chiefs themselves, if they had been quick to show submission to Shaka. But even where this happened, chiefs lost a major source of their independent power. They lost the right to summon their own regiments. The young men and women of newly conquered chiefdoms were now incorporated into the regiments of the king. A vital factor in the rapid expansion of the Zulu kingdom at this time was the important military changes introduced by Shaka. These were not entirely his own innovation but were based on developments which had taken place within the armies of Ndwandwe and Mthethwa over the previous decade. Shaka refined these and made them more efficient. The Zulu regiments were closely drilled and highly disciplined. Their principal weapon was a short stabbing-spear which replaced the former less effective, long throwing-spear. But success ultimately stemmed from the use of speed and surprise, combined with a ruthless determination to destroy the enemy.

Whereas Shaka can be seen as an aggressive nation builder, Mosheshwe stands out as a leader who built a new state for defence. His personal role was a major political factor in the emergence and growth of the Sotho state. From 1822 to 1836, when the Sotho-Tswana lands were ravaged by the Difaqane (the Sesotho word for the Mfecane), Mosheshwe gathered a band of refugees on the mountain fortress of Thaba Bosiu and created the kingdom of Lesotho. Its mountainous character helped him consolidate his kingdom. He used the *pitso*, a sort of popular parliament, to discuss matters of state with his people and to solve disputes. He had a federal system of government without a standing army, though he had an armed cavalry. His personal qualities of courage, generosity, accessibility, common sense and diplomacy facilitated his creation of a viable state. He used Catholic priests from the Paris Evangelic Missionary Society to advise his foreign policy. Ironically, his enemies helped to create his kingdom. During the Difaqane they drove people to take shelter with him, a factor made it impossible for them to leave. Following the Great Trek, the Boers occupied much of the land round the Sotho, which made it difficult for his subordinate chiefs to break away. They had to keep together to resist the Boers. Economic factors were also important in the rise of the Sotho state. Refugee groups were tempted into joining the expanding Sotho nation not least because of the economic stability it offered during a period of immense upheaval. Mosheshwe used the *mafisa* system to lend cattle to newcomers and win their loyalty and allegiance. Frequent cattle raids against neighbouring people allowed him to assemble a vast herd of his own, and he developed trade in the region with the Griquas and the Boers.

European imperialism and annexation of Africa 1850–1900

5. Assess the relative importance of the Berlin West Africa Conference and the activities of King Leopold II of Belgium in the Congo in accelerating the “scramble for Africa”.

Questions on the partition of Africa are always among the most popular on the paper, and this session is likely to be no exception. Candidates tend to ignore the precise wording of the question and write general accounts of the partition focusing on the political and economic causes. This would not be satisfactory. Good answers should focus mainly on Leopold and the conference. They should reach a supported conclusion about their relative importance. There does not have to be an equal balance but both areas should be covered in some depth. Candidates may discuss the conference at greater length, and many are likely to conclude that it was the more important factor in accelerating the scramble.

Leopold hosted an international conference on Africa in Brussels in 1876, the result of which was the creation of the International Africa Association. It became apparent that he aimed to make massive trading profits for himself and establish a political empire in the Congo region. His agent Stanley began to set up trading settlements in the Congo in 1879, and his activities stimulated rival French activity in the Congo region and led indirectly to the De Brazza-Makoko Treaty. Leopold and Stanley stepped up their activities in the Congo and the Congo Free State was established in 1884.

Rivalry over the Congo was an important reason for convening the Berlin West Africa Conference, which met at the end of 1884. Bismarck wished to divert French attention away from Alsace-Lorraine and into colonial expansion in Africa. The French and Germans persuaded the Portuguese to put territorial disputes arising out of European activities in the Congo region to an international conference which was held in Berlin (1884–1885) to contain a potentially dangerous situation. Bismarck was concerned that rivalry over Africa might lead to a European war. The unintended result of the conference was to give impetus to the partition. The treaty produced by the conference laid down ground-rules for further scrambling for Africa. Powers had to prove “effective occupation” and inform their rivals before annexing territory. The doctrine of “effective occupation” was a powerful stimulus to actual European invasion on the ground, in order to make good claims of spheres of influence on maps. The process of African treaty-making developed at an even faster pace. In a rapid sequence of events to the 1890s, commercial coastal spheres were turned into inland colonies as African states were conquered and boundary negotiations effected. By 1912 the whole of the continent, with the exception of Ethiopia and Liberia, had been brought under European colonial rule. The treaty also internationalized the Congo basin and split the Niger basin between Britain and France, recognizing the British sphere of influence in the lower Niger. The word “accelerating” in the question points to the Berlin Conference as more important factor, but it is possible to connect Leopold’s activities in the Congo to the Berlin Conference, and thereby argue that these were equally crucial.

If only Leopold II or the Berlin West Africa Conference is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

6. Analyse the various factors which facilitated the European annexation of Africa.

This may prove to be a rather tricky question as candidates might struggle to distinguish between facilitative and causative factors. The syllabus requires students to analyze how African political and military weaknesses facilitated the European annexation of Africa. This could be the focus of many answers, but it would be equally appropriate to discuss a variety of technical and medical advances in Europe which made colonization easier. These include steamships, telegrams, advances in gun technology, and the discovery of quinine to treat malaria.

Candidates could argue that the work of explorers and missionary activity were facilitative rather than causative factors. The validity of such arguments would depend on the arguments advanced and the use of supporting evidence. Missionaries often encouraged the establishment of European rule in Africa, believing that it would clear a path for evangelization and end the slave trade and fighting between African states. Their views were more influential in some countries, such as Nyasaland/Malawi and Uganda, than in others. One feature of African polities before European annexation was the small size of most states. In many areas the largest political unit was the clan. These small states were often in conflict with each other, a factor which facilitated conquest. Alliances between African states, such as that attempted by Samori Toure, were the exception rather than the rule. European invaders took advantage of these political divisions to play off one side against another and “divide and conquer”. Islam might have provided a unifying force in North Africa or in the West African Savanna, but regional animosities or rivalries between Brotherhoods created divisions within and between Islamic states. European powers were able to defeat African states in war because of their greatly superior military technology. The decisive weapon was the machine gun. As Hilaire Belloc remarked, “whatever happens we have got the Maxim, and they have not”. African armies also lacked artillery, and the few rifles they possessed were often relatively obsolete. Few African states had disciplined and well organized standing armies. Again, Samori Toure was the exception here. There are some isolated examples of prolonged resistance for example by the Nandi in East Africa, and of major defeats by African armies such as the Zulu victory over the British at Isandhlwana in 1879. Menelik’s defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896 helped Ethiopia avoid European annexation until 1936.

Other facilitative factors might include the increasing importance of public opinion as a result of the extension of the vote in several European countries, a public opinion which was itself often influenced by a pro-imperialist press. Recent scholarship has indicated that the degree of public enthusiasm for colonial adventure should **not** be exaggerated, however. Economic factors and European rivalry were causative rather than facilitative factors, and this distinction implied in the wording of the question should be respected.

Response to European imperialism (Eastern and Central Africa) 1880–1915**7. Analyse the causes and effects of the Maji Maji Rising against German rule in East Africa.**

This is a straightforward question and likely to be popular. Causes and effects should both be considered but do not expect a precise balance of the two. Many candidates will have more to say about causes than effects.

In 1905 a number of diverse ethnic groups rose against colonial rule in German East Africa. It began in the southeast of the colony among the Pogoro and Ngindo. The rising spread rapidly as the Bena, Ngoni, Zaramo, Luguru and others joined in. The social and political causes included resentment at attacks by the German authorities on traditional religious practices. The abuse of Ngindo women by colonial troops was another important factor. Religious belief was a significant feature of the Maji Maji Rising, which got its name from the magic water given by Kinjekitile, a KOLELO spirit medium on the Rufiji River. This encouraged resistance as people believed that the water would render harmless German bullets. Economic causes included forced labour and taxation, but the major grievance was the attempt of the government to force Africans to grow cotton as a cash crop for export. The soil was generally unsuitable for successful cultivation, and the plan had to be forcibly implemented. This was carried out with some brutality by the Germans and their Swahili and Arab agents, the *akidas* and *jumbes*. The imposition of a head tax and the threat of drought in the region were also factors in sparking the rebellion, which began in July 1905 in the Matumbi hills with attacks on missionaries and German administrators and their agents.

The rising took the Germans by surprise, but by the end of 1905 they had brought in reinforcements and dealt with it ruthlessly. African leaders were executed, houses burned, and crops and livestock destroyed in a scorched earth policy. The estimates of the numbers of Africans who died from the suppression of the rising and the ensuing famine vary, but it may have been as many as 200 000 or 300 000. The rising served as an inspiration to later nationalists. At the same time it showed the futility of armed resistance against a colonial power with vastly superior military technology, but also the importance of inter-ethnic unity. The Maji Maji Rising shocked the Germans and led to the establishment of a Colonial Department in Germany, which tried to introduce reforms. A new governor, Rechenberg, encouraged African cash crop farming and made European employers accept some responsibility for the health of their workers. German settlers who ill-treated their workers were punished. Rechenberg refused to impose new taxes which would have resulted in more Africans being forced to work for German settlers. In general, German rule improved in Tanganyika because of the fear of another Maji Maji Rising.

If only causes or effects are discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

8. Assess the reasons for, and the results for their country of, *either* Menelik II's resistance to the Italians *or* Apolo Kagwa's collaboration with the British.

The greatest threat to Ethiopian independence in the nineteenth century came from Italy during the reign of Menelik II. He signed the Treaty of Wichale in 1889, where Italian claims to territory in the northern part of Ethiopia were recognized in return for Italy's acceptance of Ethiopian independence. The Italian version of the treaty, however, made it mandatory for Ethiopia to use the "good offices" of the Italian government for the conduct of its foreign policy. This had the effect of turning Ethiopia into an Italian protectorate, which led to Menelik abrogating the treaty. The Italians responded by annexing small territories on the Ethiopian side of the frontier agreed at Wichale, a move which caused a further deterioration in relations. They then tried to persuade the *rases* to side with them against Menelik, but could not match the diplomatic skills of the latter. All the great provincial chiefs, who had for years been accepting gifts and arms from Italian negotiators, eventually lined up at the Battle of Adowa on the side of the emperor. An Ethiopian diplomatic mission to Russia in 1895 resulted in the conclusion of a military alliance between the two countries. All of these factors, combined with the impressive arsenal of modern weaponry acquired in previous years from the British, French and Italians themselves, emboldened Menelik to offer stern resistance when the Italians made an incursion into Ethiopian territory in December 1895. The resulting confrontation culminated in the stunning Ethiopian victory at Adowa in March 1896, where the invading Italians, who were outnumbered more than five to one, were comprehensively routed. Menelik was able to summon about 100 000 men and also enjoyed superiority over the Italians in firepower. The incompetence of the Italian commander, Baratieri, and his officers played a major part in the Ethiopian victory. Two Tigrean allies of the Italians defected to Menelik with information about Italian battle positions, yet Baratieri kept his positions. He was fed false information about Menelik's army splitting up and retreating. Menelik also owed much to the generalship of Ras Alula.

Along with his victory, Menelik's policies after Adowa were crucial in securing the recognition by European powers of the sovereignty and independence of Ethiopia. A peace treaty signed in Addis Ababa in October 1896 accepted Italian Eritrea's Mareb frontier. Menelik also had diplomatic contacts with France, and the Anglo-Ethiopian settlement of May 1897 marked the end of the European threat to Menelik's empire, at least in the short term. His post-Adowa diplomacy consolidated his battlefield success, safeguarded Ethiopia's position on all sides, and won territorial and economic concessions from powerful European countries. He used the absence of a foreign threat to lay the foundations of a modern Ethiopian state by establishing a bank, hospital, postal system and electricity grid. Diplomatic missions were established and foreign investment and technical expertise flowed into the country, as the construction of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway by the French testified.

Apolo Kagwa was a Christian chief who became prime minister of Buganda after Kabaka Mwanga was deposed in 1897. His collaboration with the British stood in stark contrast to Menelik's resistance to Italian imperialism. While it did not preserve Baganda independence, his actions secured a privileged place for Buganda within the Uganda protectorate. Apolo Kagwa had followed of consistent policy of cooperating with the British from the time he became part of the Protestant Bakungu hierarchy of county chiefs, which had risen to prominence in the court of the kabaka in the late pre-colonial period. The agents of British imperialism arrived in Uganda after the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 recognized Uganda as a British sphere of influence. Lugard, as the head of the Imperial British East African Company, sought to make this a practical reality by establishing control over the country. He supported the Protestant converts in their struggle for power over the Catholics at the Battle at Mongo Hill. Kagwa cultivated close relations with the BEAC, and welcomed the establishment of a Uganda Protectorate when the company experienced financial difficulty in 1894. He resolutely opposed the rebellion by the king of Buganda, Kabaka Mwanga, and became the senior regent as well as *katikiro* or prime minister when the kabaka was deposed in 1897. He was the leading negotiator with Sir Harry Johnston of the Uganda Agreement of 1900, which defined the basis of British administration. It rewarded him and the senior Christian leaders for their loyalty to the British with a new system of land tenure. Clearly, self-interest and the wish to preserve some measure of Baganda independence were key reasons why Kagwa chose to collaborate. His recognition that the British presented a formidable and ultimately unbeatable adversary was another factor in his decision, as was his personal identification with the colonial power as a Protestant. As a result of the Uganda Agreement, Buganda lost ultimate sovereignty but obtained a significant measure of internal autonomy and recognition of its status as a separate kingdom within Uganda. The kabakaship remained, but the kabaka's powers were limited by the establishment of a parliament called the *lukiko*. This agreement was a blow to traditional clan chiefs. The Christian chiefs benefited from *mailo* freehold land tenure. The *lukiko* was allowed to spend funds without supervision from the British, and no new direct taxes could be imposed on the Baganda without their consent.

Response to European imperialism (Southern and West Africa) 1870–1920

9. Compare and contrast the response of the Asante with that of *either* Khama or the Zulu under Cetshwayo to the extension of British colonial control in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Good answers will have a clear comparative structure which explicitly analyses similarities and differences. The Asante have been specified for West Africa so as to ensure that candidates cannot answer a second question about the Mandinka. Asante resistance might be compared to that of the Zulu, or alternatively contrasted to the collaboration of Khama and the Bamangwato. Whatever the choice, candidates will need to be aware that there will be similarities as well as differences, and to ensure that there is a reasonable balance of comparison and contrast in their answers.

The Zulu King Cetshwayo (1873–1884) favoured an anti-Boer alliance with the British, but the latter did not want a strong Zulu nation on their Natal border. In 1877, Sir Bartle Frere, the British High Commissioner at the Cape, sent an ultimatum to Cetshwayo, who accepted each of its points with the exception of one relating to the disbandment of the Zulu army. The British response was to invade Zululand in 1879, but they suffered a humiliating defeat at Isandhlwana. Cetshwayo knew his victory would provoke British retaliation, and ordered his troops to retreat and wage a guerilla war. They ignored his orders and were defeated at Ulundi. The Anglo-Zulu war resulted in the conquest and destruction of the Zulu Kingdom and the loss of Zulu independence.

Bechuanaland was recognized as part of Britain's sphere of influence at the Berlin West African Conference. Khama, ruler of the Bamangwato from 1875 to 1923, and two other Tswana rulers chose to ask for British protection in 1885. They did so in the knowledge that the British were anxious to pre-empt a Boer or a German move to take over the territory and because it was in their strategic interests to limit the power of each of these rivals in the region. Britain declared a protectorate in 1890. Khama travelled to London to persuade the Colonial Secretary to confirm the protectorate rather than come under the rule of the British South Africa Company. His cooperation with the British went as far as fighting with the BSAC in 1893 against the Ndebele, and he helped to defeat the later Shona-Ndebele rising. Though the British appointed a resident commissioner, Khama was effectively allowed to operate as an independent ruler. He used British officials against internal rivals as they approved of his policies of promoting Christianity, education, agriculture and trade.

The Asante in West Africa are part of modern day Ghana. In the early 1870s, Britain acquired a trading monopoly along the Gold Coast, and in 1874 proclaimed a colony over the coastal Fante and Ga states, which they had previously protected against Asante incursions. The Asante wanted to prevent foreign domination of the coastal trade. The British sought to assert their authority in the area by invading Asante in 1874, with an army largely made up of Africans. They defeated the Asante army and destroyed the capital Kumasi. The Asante had to renounce all rights to the Gold Coast. The British withdrew from a severely weakened Asante to avoid the expense of colonial administration. The Asante Kingdom revived after 1888 under a new asantehene, Prempeh I, who defeated rebel states and re-united the Asante Confederacy. The British feared an Asante revival and were upset by Prempeh's refusal to accept British suzerainty. The British authorities refused to recognize Asante independence and occupied Asante in 1896, partly to pre-empt French advances on the fringes of the region. The Asante did not resist and a British protectorate was proclaimed and the asantehene was exiled. But the Asante army remained intact and rose against the British in 1900, in a protracted rebellion led by the queen mother of Ejisu, Yaa Asantewaa.

There are many obvious parallels between Asante resistance and that of the Zulu, although it should be noted by stronger candidates that Cetshwayo's initial desire for an alliance with the British contrasted with the Asante position of consistent and steadfast resistance. Similarly, the dramatic but short-lived victory by the Zulu at Isandhlwana was at no point emulated by the Asante in West Africa. And while Khama's focus on diplomacy and collaboration stood in stark contrast to Asante obduracy, there are also some parallels that can be drawn between the two situations: both the Asante and Bamangwato suffered a partial loss of sovereignty to the British despite the contrast in the strategies they adopted.

If only one state is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].

10. Why were Mandinka resistance to French rule and Herero resistance to German rule both unsuccessful?

This is a straightforward question and good answers should treat both the Mandinka and Herero in some depth. The most obvious response to the question is that neither was a match for French or German military superiority, but the reality is more complex. Samori Toure had created an effective and well equipped Mandinka army, in contrast to the Herero. His forces put up spirited and prolonged resistance, unlike the Herero who were quickly defeated and then nearly exterminated by the Germans.

Samori was a Dyula soldier and trader who forged a powerful military empire in the highlands of Guinea through conquest and by co-opting rival groups. In 1881 he had his first clash with the French, who were expanding their colonial control westwards from upper Senegal. He was France's most formidable military opponent in West Africa with his army of 30 000 men, mostly foot soldiers but with an elite cavalry corps. They were well trained and armed with muskets and rifles imported from Sierra Leone. His soldiers were in the Islamic faith and felt a strong sense of Mandinka identity. His experience as a successful trader enabled him to ensure a regular supply of food and equipment for his army. He avoided direct confrontation with the French and used guerrilla tactics to devastating effect. These factors explain the initial success of his resistance, and he even signed a treaty with the French. However, peace proved to be illusory as the French used the lull in fighting to undermine him by supplying and inciting his rivals. The French invaded from the north in 1891, having overcome the resistance of the Tukulor Empire. In 1894, they overran his empire but he escaped, and he founded an entirely new empire on the northern borders of modern Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana. But Samori was now a foreign conqueror facing the internal opposition of a subject people. He finally surrendered to the French in 1898. The factors which enabled the Mandinka to resist the French for over a decade could not save them from eventual defeat. Samori did not fail as a leader. His one serious military error was his decision to attempt the capture of Sikasso. He failed to persuade the British to grant him a protectorate, or any other African leader to join him in his struggle against the French. The French themselves were formidable opponents, as ruthless in their atrocities against civilians as he was in his scorched earth policy. Samori had no real answers to the vastly superior weaponry of the French.

The Herero had no standing army, little experience of guerrilla warfare, and no means of resisting the Germans. Their economy had been crippled by the rinderpest epizootic of 1896–1897, and German settlers and traders gradually took away their grazing land and few remaining livestock. The threat of the confinement of the Herero to a native reservation by the German colonizers was a real one. Years of conflict with the neighboring Nama precluded the possibility of a united and possibly more effective response to German designs on their territory and freedom. In 1904 the Herero rose in revolt, killed over a hundred German traders and settlers, and reoccupied much of their former land. The Germans brought in reinforcements and isolated the Herero in the Waterberg area. When they broke out of their encirclement, the German general Von Trotha issued the notorious order to exterminate every Herero, man, woman or child. The retreating Herero were driven westwards into the Kalahari Desert where tens of thousands died of thirst and starvation. By the time Von Trotha's proclamation was cancelled, only a quarter of the Herero were still alive of an original population of 80 000. The Germans destroyed any remaining Herero independence by confiscating all of their cattle and deposing all of their chiefs. The survivors were forced into the position of a subordinate, low paid workforce, serving the German farms and mines.

If only Mandinka or Herero resistance is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

Developments in South Africa 1880–1994

11. In what ways was South Africa changed by the discovery of diamonds and gold?

Most candidates will structure their answers according to the typical “social, political and economic effects” format. However, other approaches, provided they are sufficiently analytical in focus, are equally acceptable.

The most obvious changes brought about by the discovery of diamonds and gold were the rapid urbanization of the South African interior and the dramatic creation of wealth. This happened first in Kimberly, which grew to become a town of 50 000 in the few years following the discovery of diamonds in 1867. Johannesburg soon became the largest and richest city in South Africa after gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand in 1886. Individuals prospecting on the diamond fields such as Alfred Beit and Cecil Rhodes, who founded the De Beers company, were able to buy out rival operators and build fabulous personal fortunes before later turning their attentions to the goldfields. The immediate political changes resulting from the discovery of diamonds were the granting of responsible government to Cape Colony in 1872 and the annexation by the Cape of the diamond fields of Griqualand West, despite the rival claims of the Griqua people and the Boer government of the Orange Free State. All of this suggests an ambition on the part of the British to control the mineral wealth of the region, a desire which became even more pronounced with the discovery of gold. This would eventually lead to conflict with the Boer republics.

On the Witwatersrand, because of the high capital costs involved in extracting the gold-bearing ore, the economic trend was towards the consolidation of the big mining houses. This led to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few so-called “randlords”, the most celebrated of whom was Barney Barnato. Some historians argue that these individuals were a crucial factor in fomenting the South African War, as they resented the fact that the Transvaal was governed by what they believed to be a politically backward Boer administration under Paul Kruger. They therefore petitioned London, and politicians in the Cape, to intervene by annexing the territory for the British Empire. Rhodes used his enormous fortune to become an agent of British imperialism in his own right, founding the chartered British South Africa Company in 1889 and becoming prime minister of the Cape in the 1890s. He was a key organizer of the ill-fated Jameson Raid of 1895, which further aggravated relations between the British and the Transvaal.

The growth of cities like Johannesburg in particular transformed the economy of the region and profoundly altered its demographics. The demand for labour on the mines, both skilled and unskilled, led to a massive influx of workers, both white and black, into the new urban centres. The white workers insisted that the skilled and better paid jobs be reserved for them, and this was one factor which contributed to the gradual introduction of a comprehensive system of racial segregation in South Africa. Another was the need to control and regulate the enormous black African population which now resided in the cities. Conditions for the black workforce were on the whole terrible, with single men forced to live away from their families in enormous fenced compounds. This led to social problems such as crime, alcoholism and prostitution. The growth of the Anglophone white population in Johannesburg meant that the Boers no longer constituted a white majority in their own country, leading to squabbles between Briton and Boer over the issue of the franchise. So-called “uitlander grievances”, which constituted the basis of the ultimatum sent by High Commissioner to the Cape Alfred Milner to the Kruger government in 1899, were thus another important cause of the South African War.

In addition to all of the above, the economy of South Africa as a whole expanded and diversified as a result of the discovery of diamonds and gold. Agriculture received a boost as a result of the increased demand for food in the cities. Over time, a manufacturing sector was also developed to meet the growing need for consumer goods. Ultimately, the discovery of diamonds and gold provided impetus for the creation of a fully integrated national economy. It was widely believed that further integration of this kind could only be brought about through closer political ties between the two British colonies and (after 1902) the two former Boer republics. The mineral revolution and the profound changes it brought about were thus important factors in the decision to create a Union of South Africa in 1910.

12. Analyse the role of Nelson Mandela in the achievement of majority rule in South Africa, from his release from prison in 1990 to the elections in 1994.

This is a straightforward question which is likely to be popular, but good answers should combine narrative with explicit analysis of the role of Mandela. Much might be written about Mandela's role before 1990, and some discussion of this would be appropriate so long as it helps to set his later role in context.

The clamour for Mandela's release grew in the 1980s, as the townships erupted in violence and international pressure on the government of PW Botha intensified. Mandela became increasingly involved in unofficial contacts with the South African government and even met with Botha. Botha's successor FW de Klerk took the world by surprise by unbanning the African National Congress (ANC) and releasing Mandela from prison in February 1990. The Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was set up and four years of intensive and dramatic negotiations led to the first non-racial elections in South Africa in 1994. In these negotiations the ANC and Mandela played a crucial role. He helped to transform the ANC from a liberation movement into a political party that was preparing for government. He ensured the party's moderation, inclusiveness and its appeal to a greater range of social groups and ideological positions than any of the other competing parties. Mandela's role was vital in ensuring that the country did not descend into the racial bloodbath that many had predicted in the run-up to the elections. Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party, along with extreme right wing elements and the mysterious "third force", did their utmost to derail negotiations by waging a clandestine war against the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal and the townships. Mandela, aware of the high stakes involved, was able to keep the firebrands in his party in check. The ANC's response to the assassination of the hugely popular Communist Party leader Chris Hani by right-wing Afrikaners was similarly restrained. Mandela's dignified and statesmanlike bearing during the period was enough to persuade many whites that the transition to majority rule would not result in the persecution of the minority white population. His moral authority was clearly a seminal factor in the creation of a new South Africa, but his record as a tough negotiator is often overlooked. Despite his willingness to compromise on certain matters, he was steadfast in his insistence on a non-racial one-person-one-vote democracy. He got much of what he wanted in the constitutional agreement, and in the run-up to elections and the ANC made much of his fitness to be the nation's first fully democratically elected president.

This is a basic outline of his role and the CODESA negotiations could be described in greater depth. The focus is on Mandela as an individual, so the contribution of the ANC as a whole, and that of De Klerk, with whom he was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993, can be referred to but should be treated more briefly.

Africa under colonialism 1890–1980

13. “Before the end of colonial rule, European settlers had more political influence in Mozambique than they enjoyed in Kenya.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

Many answers will agree with this statement because of the sheer size of the settler population in Mozambique, but allow for different, well supported viewpoints. Answers which agree or disagree with the statement but in a qualified manner are to be encouraged. It could be argued that Mozambique became independent in 1975, twelve years later than Kenya, because of the different policies of the two colonial powers involved, Portugal and Britain, and not because of varying degrees of influence in the respective settler populations.

There were as many as 300 000 Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, as well as smaller numbers of Greeks, Italians, Afrikaners and other nationalities. The Portuguese government encouraged settlement in the colony, especially in the post-Second World War period as means of reducing the levels of unemployment in a struggling metropolitan economy. Land in Africa was granted to soldiers after they completed their terms of service. Settlers in Mozambique were often labourers, artisans and small-scale farmers. Many were not well-skilled and some were even illiterate. This reflected the poverty and low level of education in Portugal itself. The poor white settlers felt threatened by the prospect of African competition in the labour market, and were often even more racist in outlook than the Portuguese government. The vast majority shared the determination of the government of Salazar, prime minister from 1932 to 1968, and his successor Caetano, to maintain control of the African population and retard its political progress. But the settlers did not determine the political development of Mozambique to any significant extent. That was decided by the government in Lisbon. The political influence of the settler community was circumscribed by the constitutional status of the territory: Mozambique was not a colony but an overseas province of Portugal. Mozambique gained independence in 1975, but only after a protracted independence war and a military coup in Portugal.

In Kenya, the sizeable settler community wanted more European agricultural development to the exclusion of Africans, more independence from Britain, white racial superiority and the separate development of European and non-European populations. These aspirations were initially supported by colonial governors such as Eliot, Sadler and Northey. The 1920s seemed to mark a weakening of settler control. The Devonshire White Paper of 1923 stated that “the interests of the African native must be paramount”. However, the recommendations of the report were short on policy specifics and the status quo in the colony was maintained, something which also disappointed the large Indian trading community, which had hoped for equal status to the whites. The Second World War hastened the growth of African nationalism. In 1952 Governor Baring declared a State of Emergency and asked for British troops to be flown to Kenya. By 1956, the Mau Mau rising was collapsing, but the rising demonstrated that Kenyans would only accept majority rule, that the settlers were unable to control the internal situation, and that the responsibility for a permanent settlement lay not with them but the government in London. Much to the alarm of many settlers, this was to lead to Kenya’s independence in 1963.

It can be argued that in both colonies political development depended much more on the policies of the metropolitan government than on the attitude and actions of settlers. Nonetheless, it could also be argued that these policies were often influenced by the interests of the settle community and the anticipated impact on settler opinion. This would explain the reluctance of the administration in Kenya to implement the recommendations of the Devonshire White Paper, for instance. Answers should be focused, balanced and detailed.

If only Mozambique or Kenya is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

- 14. Using *one* example of a country where direct rule was implemented and *one* where indirect rule was implemented, analyse the reasons why each of these systems of administration were chosen by the colonial power. Examples can be chosen from any countries in Eastern, Central and West Africa.**

This is a very open-ended question and there are many examples to choose from. Answers should avoid vague generalizations and analyse two separate examples in some depth. Many candidates will use examples of British colonial rule, but examples of French, Belgian, German or Portuguese colonies are also encouraged.

In a general sense, one of the main theoretical benefits of the model of indirect rule was that it reduced the costs of administration by derogating power to indigenous authorities. This would in turn entail less disruption to the lives of ordinary Africans and to the local political rhythms of the colony. This was important in territories which encompassed a wide diverse range of traditions and ethnicities. Under indirect rule, African polities could develop at their own pace. The model of direct rule, on the other hand, offered far greater potential for the social, economic and political transformation of the colony, and held out the hope and possibility that African subjects could be successfully “civilized” and perhaps even incorporated into the body politic of the metropolis. Candidates might rightly point out that in some colonies more than one administrative model was implemented, and that it wasn’t simply a case of “either one or the other”.

For direct rule, French colonies might provide the best example. On a general level, the French harboured idealistic beliefs about the innate superiority of their own civilization, and felt that it was part of their colonial mission to impart their cultural values on Africans through the model of direct rule. Things were to turn out rather differently in practice. Although the French began by attempting to implement a very limited policy of assimilation in four Senegalese towns, they used African chiefs elsewhere at low levels of local government. Most of those appointed became in effect French government officials, whose job it was to collect taxes, recruit labour (including forced labour), and suppress opposition. Fifteen million Africans under French rule had hardly any legal or political rights, and were classified as *sujets* or subjects, at least until 1946. Education was one way in which Africans would be acculturated. It was planned to be of a high academic standard and delivered through the medium of French. In reality, very few Africans enjoyed access to it.

The British system of indirect rule, pioneered by Lugard to administer the Sokoto Caliphate of Northern Nigeria, was adopted because it was believed to be the cheapest and most effective way of administering vast populations and areas with the minimum of European personnel. But the application of indirect rule varied enormously from colony to colony, and was not always in practice very different from French systems in its impact on African subjects. Though the British paid more attention than the French to the legitimacy of a candidate’s claim to chieftaincy, they did not hesitate to invent chieftaincies in stateless societies such as the Igbo of Nigeria and the Kikuyu of Kenya. The British made more use of traditional African systems of arbitration than the French, and allowed chiefs to judge local civil disputes and minor cases because this was administratively convenient and reduced the cost of colonial administration. It could also mean that chiefs rather than British colonial administrators were the target of African hostility when they enforced unpopular colonial laws.

Portuguese administrative policy was in theory similar to the French. A tiny minority of the African population was classified as *assimilado*, but they did not have the voting rights of French-assimilated citizens in Senegal. The vast majority of African subjects of Portuguese rule, the *indigena*, faced punitive taxation and forced labour. While the Belgians used limited indirect rule in Rwanda and Burundi, where there was a clearly defined pre-colonial authority structure similar to that recognized by the British in Buganda, they allowed no participation in local politics in the Belgian Congo, and actively discouraged secondary, let alone tertiary, education.

This is unlikely to be a popular question but good answers should have a specific, detailed and focused knowledge of two contrasting examples.

If only one example is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

Social and economic developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries 1800–1960

15. **“The status of women in Africa improved during the colonial period.” With specific reference to one of either Southern, West or Eastern and Central Africa, how far do you agree with this statement?**

Most of the textbooks currently in use in schools which study African history do not do justice to the topic of women, and few candidates are likely to have covered it in depth. There may thus be a tendency for candidates to produce vague generalizations without much supporting evidence. Good answers should use examples from one African region to agree or disagree, partially or wholly, with the statement.

Women sometimes benefited from religious and educational changes, especially in areas with established Christian missions which greater gender equality was stressed and where discriminatory traditional practices were censured. Christian schools could sometimes help to increase the average age at which girls were married and assist them in gaining access to employment. Most women in the colonial period, however, continued to marry soon after they could bear children. On the whole, colonial change was less liberating for women than for young men. Women’s experiences differed, but many suffered as a result of economic changes. Following the abolition of domestic slavery, the work of former male slaves often fell to women. They were sometimes obliged to work for wages on cash-crop farms in addition to their domestic duties, while the men took most of the income. Many women profited from expanding food markets, but few had cattle or land of their own. The frequent seizure of land by colonial authorities and settlers meant that women tended to lose access to their sole source of economic independence, and this had had the effect of reinforcing traditional structures of patriarchy. The experience of Kikuyu women in Kenya is a good case in point.

When men migrated to towns in search of work and wider experience, women were often left to work in agriculture and care for children. This affected women in Southern Africa in particular, where much of the male workforce migrated to the Witwatersrand to work on the gold mines. The impact on the traditional structure of the family was profound, usually to the detriment of women, who often had to assume the additional burden of looking after extended family. If the migrant husband was poorly paid, the wife might also have to take on casual wage labour. West African women retained their place in trade, but most new economic opportunities tended to be the preserve of men. Across the continent, women often supplied domestic services or were even reduced to prostitution in towns dominated by wifeless young men. Women also found few political roles in the new colonial order.

The colonial era did not destroy traditional cultural institutions. Even though Christian missionaries tended to oppose traditions such as bride-price, the practice persisted and survives to this day in many parts of the continent, not least because it is supported by women and their families. Christian intolerance of polygamy and divorce had a variable impact. While chiefs’ harems gradually disappeared, polygamy did not. It has been estimated that in West Africa over 40 % of wives were still in polygamous unions when colonial rule ended. In Central and Eastern Africa, however the proportion of polygamous wives is estimated to have dropped to about 25 %, perhaps because of land scarcity, labour migration and high levels of bride price in cattle to be paid by the would-be husband. Attempts to eradicate the practice of female genital mutilation in some parts of the continent were also unsuccessful.

The statement is obviously open to challenge and good answers might stress how limited the improvement was. They might also discuss what the status of women should be and what might constitute an improvement.

16. Explain the reasons for the revival and spread of Islam in the nineteenth century in *either* West *or* Eastern and Central Africa.

In previous years, when questions have been set on the spread of Islam or the slave trade, very few candidates have opted for East Africa. In Eastern and Central Africa, the spread of Islam from the coast to Unyamwezi, Buganda and further east was mainly the result of the establishment of an Omani sultanate in Zanzibar and the activities of the Arab and Swahili Muslim traders. Decisions taken by African rulers often played a big part in the spread of a particular religion. Mutesa I of Buganda encouraged trade with Muslim traders from the coast, and this briefly promoted the spread of Islam in Buganda. But Mutesa later invited Christian missions into the country when faced by the threat of Muslim invasion from Sudan. The Islamic presence along the Swahili coast and in other parts of the region such as Somalia and Ethiopia pre-dates the period. Reference might also be made to the activities of Mahdists in the Sudan, whose dramatic emergence as a political and social force resulted from the imposition of Turco-Egyptian rule, the heavy taxation levied by force on the pastoralist community by the authorities, and the attempts of the government to suppress the slave trade. Not least of the reasons for its emergence, however, was the charismatic and pious figure of the Mahdi, who inspired a devoted band of followers with his leadership.

Most answers are likely to focus on West Africa, where the impact of Islam was much more extensive. Its revival was associated with a number of jihads such as those of Dan Fodio, who created the Sokoto Caliphate, and that of Al-hajj Umar. These jihads were aspects of a Muslim revival aimed at purifying Islam and strengthening its general influence, political as well as religious, in the area. Dan Fodio was a Fulani living in the nominally Muslim state of Gobir. He was an Islamic scholar and believer, associated with the Qadiriyya Brotherhood. The sultans of Gobir tried to curb his activities, but his followers had the fervour of people who considered themselves to be true believers fighting a holy war. His brother and son also provided effective military leadership. The success of his jihad strengthened Islam and Sharia courts became more important. Al-hajj Umar joined the rival Tijaniyya Brotherhood, but he was inspired by the example of Dan Fodio. His attempts to spread Islam by force were not always successful, but they did help in the promotion of Islamic education and the expansion of Islamic Brotherhoods. Samori Toure also promoted Islam in his expanding Mandinka Empire. Vague generalizations should of course be avoided, but it would be valid to argue that the revival and spread of Islam may have been promoted by the relative simplicity of its teachings, the fact that it could accommodate traditional African customs like polygamy, and that the Muslim leaders were themselves African. Unlike Christianity, it was not associated with the colonial power, and its spread was not linked to the provision by missionaries of medical and health facilities. The importance of the growth in trade in the region was also of the utmost importance in promoting the spread of Islam, as was the education offered in Quranic schools. The conversion of the elites also did much facilitate its spread among the general population.

Candidates may also refer briefly to factors which limited the spread of Islam. These might include the spread of Christianity, such as among the Igbo or Baganda, or the presence of an established orthodox Christian faith in Ethiopia, which limited the potential of Islam to spread still further. The survival and adaptation of traditional African religious movements, which still remained the religions of the vast majority of Africans at the end of the nineteenth century, could also be mentioned.

Nationalist and independence movements (Eastern and Central Africa)

17. Analyse the role of Robert Mugabe in the Liberation War and the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe in 1980.

Discussion of Mugabe's policies in independent Zimbabwe is not relevant to this question. Good answers should combine narrative with some explicit analysis.

By the time Ian Smith announced the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia in 1965, Mugabe was already politically active. He had been frequently arrested for his protests against the failure of the British to deliver independence under majority rule and the political domination of the colony by the white settler minority. He had left Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) to join the newly-formed Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) under Rev. Sithole. The split in ZAPU mirrored the principal ethnic cleavage in the country, with many ZAPU leaders coming from the minority Ndebele while ZANU was dominated by the Shona majority. Mugabe was imprisoned for a long period but was released in 1974 as part of a Smith amnesty. However, ZANU remained banned. Mugabe replaced Sithole as leader of ZANU upon his release. When Mozambique became independent in 1975, ZANU's operational headquarters relocated from Zambia to Mozambique and Mugabe helped to reactivate its military wing. He came to be recognized by African leaders as a major candidate for the leadership of the still-divided liberation movement. He was active in party affairs and military strategy, and travelled widely to win international support for the diplomatic campaign against Smith, who had co-opted Bishop Muzorewa in order to give the impression that he was ready to share power and accept African leadership in a new multi-racial dispensation.

ZANLA, the military wing of ZANU, had 20 000 armed fighters. Mugabe and Nkomo, who were both Marxists, had temporarily put aside their differences in order to form the Patriotic Front, and both leaders took part in another round of peace talks in Malta in 1978. They insisted on elections leading to an independent and non-racial Zimbabwe. In 1979 Mugabe led the ZANU (PF) delegation to all-party talks at Lancaster House in London. These resulted in an agreement to hold elections. Mugabe went back to Zimbabwe in January 1980 and announced that ZANU (PF) would contest the election separately from ZAPU. He emphasized the need for reconciliation and for the full implementation of all of the provisions of the Lancaster House agreement. These included reserving 20 out of 100 parliamentary seats for whites. ZANU (PF) won 57 seats and Mugabe became prime minister and defense minister, but presided over a coalition government which included ZAPU together with white politicians.

Mugabe played a crucial role in the liberation war as political and military strategist, but he was fortunate to have a base in Mozambique and to receive financial and material support from other African countries, especially Tanzania. Apart from Mugabe, ZANLA had other talented military leaders like Edger Tekere. Candidates could also mention the South African decision to withdraw military support from the Smith regime, and the role of the British government. Margaret Thatcher was persuaded by Lord Carrington to hold the Lancaster House Conference which resulted in the final breakthrough. All of these points might be discussed in a good answer, as they place Mugabe's role in context.

18. “Ethnic and religious rivalries explain why Uganda achieved independence later than Tanganyika.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

As with other quotations, candidates are free to agree or disagree in whole or in part, so long as they present supported arguments. The statement can be challenged on the grounds that there were other factors which facilitated the earlier achievement of independence by Tanganyika.

In many ways, Uganda was a much more obvious candidate for early independence than Tanganyika. Makerere University was established in 1922, and Uganda had many well educated potential leaders by the late 1950s. The colony had few settlers and a well developed infrastructure. But there were several negative factors which delayed the achievement of independence in Uganda. These included the special position of Buganda and the intransigence of the kabaka, factors which were compounded by his deportation in 1953 and triumphant return in 1955. During the colonial period the British had treated the kingdom of Buganda like a separate political unit. The Buganda royalist party (Kabaka Yekka) had no programme beyond securing a privileged place for the Buganda kingdom within Uganda. Uganda lacked both charismatic leaders and genuinely nationalist parties. The UPC, led by Milton Obote, was the successor to the UNC which had disintegrated in the 1950s. It tried to unite nationalist forces across Uganda. However, it was Protestant-dominated and faced strong competition from the more conservative Catholic-dominated Democratic Party. In order to win power, the UPC entered into a marriage of convenience with the KY, and Uganda became independent in 1962 with an uneasy coalition of a royalist Buganda party and a nationalist party. Both were largely Protestant but had little else in common. The kabaka became president, and Obote prime minister. The rich farmers in Buganda were attracted to the KY while Protestant leaders and traders in the rest of the country favoured the UPC. However, neither of these attracted the Catholic civil servants, other educated elites and trade unionists, who rallied to the DP. Political divisions also reflected ethnic cleavages: Obote was seen as the non-Ganda leader of the non-Bantu speaking peoples of the colony, and his alliance with the KY was therefore highly ironic and unlikely. The independence of Uganda was delayed by the emergence of rival political parties, each of which reflected ethnic and religious interests.

Tanganyika, in contrast, benefited from the emergence of a single, dominant nationalist party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), and the peaceful, non-confrontational leadership of the charismatic Nyerere who respectfully known as Mwalimu, the teacher. He helped build TANU into a party that won the trust of all the ethnic and racial groups, and had such mass appeal that it won the most overwhelming victory of any African political party before independence. He was helped by the relative absence of ethnic rivalry and the unifying influence of English and Kiswahili, the impact of UN Trusteeship status on the territory, and the good working relationship he established with Governor Turnbull from 1958. Also significant was the large number of ethnic groups in the Tanganyika, and the fact that none of these were privileged or numerically dominant, as the Baganda were in Uganda. Neither Tanganyika nor Uganda, unlike Kenya, had its independence delayed by the presence of a large settler population. While there was of course a religious divide in Tanganyika between Christian and Muslim, religion was less politically significant than in Uganda, where rivalries between Catholic, Protestant and Muslim dated back to the factional chicanery in the kabaka's court in the nineteenth century.

Nationalist and independence movements (Southern and West Africa)

19. Why did Senegal achieve independence in 1960?

This may seem a very straightforward question, but strong responses will place events in Senegal in the wider context of French colonial policy and explain the different circumstances which allowed Guinea to achieve independence two years earlier.

French-speaking West Africa moved towards independence in a completely different manner from Britain's colonies. For many years the main ambition of Africans had been to attain greater equality in Overseas France. Once nationalists were determined to attain full independence, another issue arose over whether French West African colonies should remain a single federation after it was achieved. Full federation was favoured by Senegalese politicians led by Leopold Senghor. In 1946, a French Union was created in which the colonies or overseas territories would enter into a constitutional partnership with the metropolis. The colonies would have their own assemblies but also send representatives to the National Assembly in Paris. All inhabitants became French citizens and forced labour was abolished. The law which established this was named after the Senegalese politician Lamine Gueye. He and Senghor had campaigned from the 1930s for two Senegalese seats in the French Assembly. The first African to be elected a deputy in the French Assembly in 1914 had been Blaise Diagne from Senegal. Gueye and Senghor were consistently elected to the French Assembly, and both opposed the formation of the RDA by Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast, partly because of its links with the French Communist Party. Houphouet-Boigny broke off links with the Communists, became a minister in the French government, and helped to frame the Loi-Cadre of 1956 which marked a major change in French colonial policy as it gave French colonies considerable autonomy.

A further decisive change took place in 1958 when President de Gaulle came to power and offered France's West African territories the choice of self-government within a French community or complete independence with all the links with France broken. Only Guinea under Sekou Toure chose independence following a referendum. Senghor still hoped for a federation but when it became evident that that wasn't possible, he decided that Senegal should form a more limited federation with the former French Soudan as the Federation of Mali. He had formed a political party, the PRA, in pursuit of this end. Senegal became independent in 1960, the same year as all of the other French West African colonies except Guinea, as part of the Mali Federation. However, the Federation was short-lived partly due to irreconcilable differences between Senghor and the Soudanese leader Modibo Keita. By the end of the year Senegal and the Republic of Mali had become separate independent states. The former was dominated by the newly-elected President Senghor and his party, the UPS or Progressive Senegalese Union, which held all 80 seats in the Legislative Assembly.

In summary, Senegal achieved independence when it did partly as a result of changing French colonial policy. Other factors included the impact of the independence of Ghana in 1957 and Guinea in 1958, and the influence of Senegalese leaders, most notably Senghor. Good answers should cover most of these aspects and combine narrative with explicit analysis.

20. Why was independence achieved so late, and only after an armed struggle, in Angola and Namibia?

Good answers should discuss both Namibia and Angola in some depth and have a balanced coverage of the two. In each case the ruling power was extremely reluctant to concede independence, and freedom was achieved only after a long struggle. Both countries had a substantial European settler presence which was opposed to majority rule. Namibia had been the German colony of South West Africa but was ruled by South Africa after 1919. Angola was a Portuguese colony, but in 1951 the government of Antonio Salazar decreed that it was an “overseas province”. During the next two decades the white settler population grew rapidly, as did tensions between black African and the white community. In Angola, as well as in Namibia, the African majority could not remain immune to the nationalist wave sweeping across the continent in the 1960s.

The Portuguese government initiated limited reforms in Angola in response to the nationalist threat but these were inadequate. The first serious uprising was in February 1961. The Portuguese responded with determination and ruthlessness, and according to estimates as many as 10 000 may have died. The independence war continued. Unlike other colonial powers, Portugal was a dictatorship and was fully prepared to ignore international condemnation. South Africa was equally prepared to defy international opinion in Namibia. After Salazar’s retirement in 1968, his successor Caetano continued his policy for a few years until the economic cost of the war became intolerable. Independence for Angola came only after the Portuguese army lost the will to continue the conflict and suffer further losses, and it overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship in a coup in 1974. The new military regime granted independence to Angola in 1975.

In Namibia, the United Nations was to play a major role. Responsibility for administering the former German colony of South West Africa was entrusted to the South Africans by the League of Nations in 1919. After the Second World War Namibia became the responsibility of the UN Trusteeship Council, but the South African government refused to transfer the mandate. After 1948, the South African government withdrew co-operation with the UN but stopped short of annexation. However, apartheid laws were introduced. The Namibian issue was twice referred to the International Court of Justice, which in 1971 gave an advisory opinion that South Africa was in illegal possession and should withdraw. The General Assembly established an eleven-nation Council to administer South West Africa until independence, but its authority was ignored by Pretoria. From 1966, the General Assembly and the Security Council passed a series of resolutions which had little impact on the situation in Namibia. By the mid-1980s, South Africa was prepared to give up Namibia, but only on condition that Cuban troops were withdrawn from Angola. The end of the Cold War, together with the South African military defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988, transformed the situation. The Security Council established a small mission, UNAVEM, to verify Cuban withdrawal from Angola, and in 1989 established the UN transition group in Namibia, UNTAG. This consisted of eight thousand peacekeepers and civilians who were deployed to organize and supervise elections and monitor the South African withdrawal. Elections in November 1989 resulted in victory for Sam Nujoma’s SWAPO, which had been conducting an armed struggle against Pretoria since 1966. Nujoma became the first president of independent Namibia in March 1990.

Good answers will stress that the main reason for the late independence of Namibia was South Africa’s intransigence over the matter until the end of the Cold War. Similarly, Portugal’s reluctance to give up on its African empire was a key reason for the delay in Angolan independence until 1975.

If only one country is dealt with, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

Post-independence politics to 2000

21. What policies were adopted to combat illiteracy and disease in any *two* independent African countries up until 2000?

Few candidates will have studied this topic and it is unlikely that many will attempt the question. They may produce very general answers, but this would be unsatisfactory as the question requires specific reference to relevant policies in two countries. The choice of South Africa post 1994 should be accepted, although strictly speaking South Africa became independent in 1910 under minority rule.

The most obvious strategy for combating illiteracy was through the wider provision of education, especially primary schooling, but also at the secondary and tertiary levels. Providing mass education was however a very expensive undertaking, as it included spending on school facilities, libraries and equipment, especially at university level. Most of the costs were borne by national treasuries, though these were assisted by foreign aid and to a limited extent by UNESCO. All independent African countries tried to combat illiteracy by a massive increase in primary school enrolment. However, this still left many older people illiterate. Primary education was rarely free before 2000, which made it inaccessible to millions of young people. Females were often under represented at school, and rural areas tended to fare worse than urban areas. Most independent African countries chose to combat illiteracy by promoting the language of the colonial power with the exception of Tanzania, which chose Kiswahili both to promote literacy, national unity and traditional culture.

Combating disease was also costly, but every independent country tried to promote the training of doctors and the provision of clinics and hospitals. Two UN bodies provided the model of best practice. The WHO succeeded in eradicating smallpox, and UNICEF helped reduce infant mortality through their program of promoting oral rehydration to combat diarrhoea, immunization which almost eradicated polio, breast feeding, healthy eating and family planning. Efforts to combat disease received a huge setback in the 1980s with the start of the Aids pandemic. Estimates suggest that by the early 1990 perhaps 2 % of all sub-Saharan Africa's adults were infected with HIV. The worst affected country was Uganda, with perhaps 1 300 000 HIV sufferers, (8 % of its entire population), including as much as 25 % of the population of the capital Kampala. President Museveni supported a massive awareness program to get Ugandans to talk openly about HIV/AIDS, to change their sexual practices and to learn how to cope with the disease. This campaign had great success and the rate of Aids infection fell sharply.

The policy of the Ugandan government was in sharp contrast to that of South Africa. By 1998 the Department of Health calculated that nearly 10 % of the population was HIV positive. The government reaction was confused and controversial. From 1997 to 2000 Mbeki agreed with the few doctors who argued that the link between HIV and AIDs was unproven. He supported an anti-Aids campaign awareness program, but refused to promote a larger-scale and costlier initiative to provide anti-retroviral treatment for sufferers. Many African governments deliberately understated the scale of the Aids problem for fear of damaging their tourist industry. Government policies could be diluted or obstructed by religious opposition, both Christian and Islamic, to the promotion of the use of condoms.

Candidates might also note that governments encouraged the work of a number of different NGOs and missions, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres, the Red Cross, CAFOD and Feed the Children.

22. Compare and contrast the reasons for, and the results of, military intervention in any two African countries since independence.

Good answers should have a clear comparative structure and focus explicitly on similarities and differences. Expect a reasonable balance between “reasons for” and “results of”. There are plenty of examples to choose from, including many West African States such as Ghana and Nigeria, as well as Congo, Zaire, Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda. Military intervention could be external as well internal. For example, Tanzanian troops and Ugandan exiles invaded Uganda in 1979 and overthrew the regime of Idi Amin. Military intervention could be undertaken as a result of a number of factors, but a frequent common reason was that soldiers got involved in order to overthrow unpopular and corrupt civilian administrations and restore good governance. Ethnic rivalry and personal ambition were other common causes of army intervention, but in many cases the reasons were more specific. Military intervention could of course fail, as in Kenya in August 1982, where civilian rule was restored in less than a day.

In Uganda, Milton Obote failed to maintain army loyalty, and the army commander Idi Amin suspected that he was soon to be replaced. He took advantage of Obote’s absence at a Commonwealth Conference in Singapore to stage a coup. For quite different reasons, Amin was himself overthrown by the Tanzanian army in 1979, and Obote by another army coup in 1985. Massive human rights violations committed by the Amin regime, together with a cross-border refugee crisis, prompted the Tanzanian intervention, while it was ethnic rivalries within the army that led to an Acholi-led coup against Obote’s tribe, the Langi. Sudan has had mostly military leaders since its independence in 1956. It has been ruled by a succession of military rulers, including Numeiry and El-Bashir. Military intervention in Ethiopia had quite different causes and results. There was a short-lived coup in 1960, largely provoked by discontent with the rule of Haile Selassie. A provisional military council known as the Derg seized power in 1974, and by 1976 Mengistu emerged as the head of a military dictatorship. Widespread corruption, famine, and the feeling that Selassie was a US puppet were all factors in his downfall. Student activism and opposition was another very important factor in his replacement by the military. Both Ghana and Nigeria had military coups in early 1966. In Nigeria, the widespread belief that the elections of 1964–1965 had been rigged finally destroyed the credibility of the civilian government. Similarly in Ghana, corruption, lavish spending and intolerance of criticism led to the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966. There had been a growing feeling among Ghanaians that Nkrumah was playing the international statesman at the expense of his country’s mounting economic problems. But there were in addition specific military grievances related to pay, proposed cuts in the defence budget, and alleged government interference. The first army coup in Nigeria in 1966 was followed by another in July, amid fears of ethnic domination by the Igbo. The massacre of thousands of them in the north led Colonel Ojukwu to declare a secessionist state of Biafra in the southeast. This led to civil war from 1967 to 1970. Meanwhile the military government in Ghana, having purged the civil service of Nkrumah’s political supporters, handed power back to the civilian politician Kofi Busia. When he failed to solve Ghana’s mounting economic problems in the face of a further sharp fall in world cocoa prices, the army returned to power under Acheampong in 1972. Once again specific military grievances, including further cuts in the military budget, seem to have prompted the army action.

Results varied widely. They were often but not always negative. Some military rulers, especially in Ghana and Nigeria, were prepared to hand power back to civilian authorities. In assessing results, candidates might judge how far the military rulers solved the problems they sought to remedy. Military interventions in Nigeria sharpened ethnic rivalry, although Gowon achieved a remarkable level of reconciliation after the civil war ended. In Sudan, the issue of arabization led to prolonged Southern resistance led by the Sudan People's Liberation Army. In Ethiopia, thousands were killed or tortured as Mengistu imposed his vision of Marxism-Leninism and wiped out opponents. Tigrayan and Eritrean nationalist movements finally drove him from power in 1991. Amin's rule had a major and profoundly negative impact on the people of Uganda, the Ugandan Asians and the East African community as a whole, and led indirectly to the return of Obote.

If only one country is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].

Africa, international organizations and the international community

23. Why was the United Nations initially more successful in the Congo than in Somalia before 2000?

The UN was set up in 1945 with peacekeeping as one of its main objectives. At the time, this was understood as entailing the prevention of or bringing a peaceful end to conflict between states. The problem in later years, especially in Africa, was that most conflict was within states, often as an indirect result of artificially created colonial boundaries. Conflicts like those in the Congo and Somalia were very difficult to deal with, as many of the conditions for successful resolution were lacking. For some chance of success, the parties to the conflict had to be genuinely willing to co-operate. The Security Council had to award a clear mandate and provide adequate finances, manpower, equipment and resources for the UN operations. In the case of both the Congo and Somalia, the UN struggled with problems surrounding these issues. However, most candidates will agree that in the Congo the UN was at least initially more successful.

ONUC (1960–1964), the acronym for the first UN operation in the Congo, was at the time the most complex civilian and military operation ever mounted by the organization. Its chances of success were complicated by the impact of the Cold War. When Belgian Congo became independent in 1960, there were few Congolese doctors, senior government administrators, lawyers or army officers. Within days there was a mutiny in the armed forces, together with widespread rioting and attacks on Europeans. The Belgians illegally sent in troops to protect their nationals. The president of the mineral-rich province of Katanga, Moïse Tshombe, announced its secession with Belgian help. Prime Minister Lumumba, who was supported by the Soviet Union, asked for the UN's help. The Security Council authorized a mission and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld organized ONUC, a peacekeeping operation. The first peacekeepers were from five African countries but they were increased to 10 000 troops with contingents from India, Pakistan, Sweden and Finland. Hammarskjöld was reluctant to intervene in Katanga where Lumumba was murdered in June 1961. The Americans had backed his rival and successor, Mobutu Sese Seko. Hammarskjöld himself died in a plane crash on his way to meet Tshombe later in 1961. The next Secretary-General U Thant was authorized by the Security Council to remove mercenaries and end the secession of Katanga, which was achieved in 1962. ONUC withdrew in 1964. It was not an unqualified success but the UN could be credited with the removal of illegal Belgian troops, the prevention of foreign intervention, maintaining the economy and administration of the country, and ultimately in reuniting the Congo.

The UN could point to no such success in Somalia. After the military dictator Siad Barre fled Mogadishu, Somalia became a failed state. Two major parts of the country, Somaliland and Puntland, seceded. The UN did little while civil war broke out, 350 000 died of famine and another million fled to refugee camps. In 1992, 500 Pakistani peacekeepers arrived but UNOSOM had a wholly inadequate mandate. The US intervention in 1993 was a complete failure. The UN withdrew in 1995, having failed to re-unite Somalia or end the civil war between rival clan warlords. Indeed, militias loyal to the warlords, particularly those of Mohamed Aideed, would regularly attack the peacekeepers and generally hamper UN operations. The failure of UNOSOM to disarm the militias was thus one of the reasons for its withdrawal. The international community had very little interest in Somalia, whereas the resources of the Congo made it a focus of American and Russian Cold War rivalries and the US, especially under President Kennedy, was prepared to subsidize a substantial and fairly successful operation. Whereas some African countries were prepared to contribute to the operation in the Congo, the same was not true of Somalia because the OAU discouraged the intervention of its members in the affairs of fellow member states.

If only the Congo or Somalia is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].

24. Assess the regional impact of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) up until 2000.

ECOWAS, founded in Lagos in 1975, was significant as a regional organization in that its membership of sixteen states cut across the barriers of Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. In 1993 its members signed the Cotonou treaty, committing them to the establishment of a common trading market and currency, but this has yet to be fully realized. It did not try to embark upon political union but concentrated on gradually increasing regional economic cooperation, starting with transport and telecommunications and moving on to greater financial and commercial interchange. EUMOA, an organization which worked towards the achievement of a single economic community in the region, was created in 1994. Unfortunately it included only the Francophone countries which used the CFA Franc, as well as Guinea Bissau. The establishment of Ecobank, a regional development bank, in 1985 was a major success for ECOWAS, as it has worked to promote economic growth across the region ever since. In 1990 ECOWAS took the bold political initiative of assembling a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in war-torn Liberia. Though it had mixed results there, and later on in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire, as any international organization would have in a situation of civil war, it showed what could be achieved by African leaders taking collective responsibility for affairs beyond their own immediate national borders.

The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was founded in 1980. It brought together the different states in Southern Africa in a bid to gradually break their economic dependence on South Africa, and to work towards ending the apartheid regime in that country. Namibia joined it on achieving independence in 1990. SADCC, like ECOWAS, enabled its region to coordinate negotiations for long-term development loans. SADCC began moves towards establishing a regional economic and trading network, and in 1993 it changed its name to the Southern African Development Community, as it looked forward to the incorporation of a free South Africa under majority rule. It was also involved in the struggle to end apartheid and bring about majority rule in South Africa. This was of course achieved in 1994, the same year in which South Africa joined the organization. Candidates would be justified in pointing out that the regional impact of SADCC, especially during the early years of the organization, was rather limited, not least because of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, ideological differences between the different governments, and differing strategies towards dealing with the apartheid government in South Africa.

If only ECOWAS or SADCC is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].